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Abstract
We know that people strike bargains and that civilized life could not proceed otherwise.
We do not know how bargains are struck.  We have no explanation of bargaining, comparable to
the general equilibrium in the economy, accounting for essential features of bargaining as we
know it with reference to universal self-interested behaviour subject only to economy-wide rules.
This claim is supported here in a survey of the principal models of bargaining: as a reflection of a
shared sense of fairness, as an imposed sequence of offers, as a source of transaction cost and as
a species of conflict. Also discussed is the dual role of bargaining in politics as a necessary
complement to voting and as an impediment to the exploitation of minority groups.
JEL Classification C7
Keywords: bargaining, compromise, fairness, self-interest, transaction cost, conflict
1“...think of the formation of governments as involving bargaining in the sense typically
understood by civilians, meaning private negotiation between key players as opposed to the
sequential broadcasting of public offers. If we concede to orthodox bargaining models their own
special use of the word “bargaining”, we may usefully refer to negotiation over government
formation as the unstructured interaction that takes place between principals in private. Privacy is
of the essence, since what is made public following negotiations is what negotiators choose to
make public, nothing more.” Michael Laver (2008, page 17) 
“...constitutional rules are themselves amenable to amendment, but only through a process of
negotiation which ensures that there is an opportunity for the constitutionally defined rights of all
the parties to be respected and reconciled”, Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re: Secession of
Quebec, (1998 at paragraph 76).
“..if we economists mind our own business, and do that business well, we can, I believe,
contribute mightily to the economizing, that is to the full but thrifty utilization, of that scarce
resource Love - which we know, just as well as anybody else, to be the most precious thing in the
world.” D. H. Robertson “What does the Economist Economize?”(1956, page 154).  
Society runs on a mixture of self-interest and bargaining within the confines of generally-
accepted rules. Economics is the study of self-interest as exemplified by the competitive
economy where, contrary to what one might expect, an efficient outcome emerges when each
person does what is best for himself alone without concern for the welfare of anybody else.
Bargaining as compromise is fundamentally different. You want this, I want that, and we strike a
deal where each gets a portion, but only a portion, of his demands.  
This paper is a study of bargaining models with special reference to the economist’s quest
to explain as much a possible of the world as the outcome of purely self-interested behaviour.  It
is argued that the objective has, at best, been attained imperfectly. The theories to be discussed
are insightful, but their assumptions are far from the circumstances of negotiation and the
motivations of the negotiators. A bargaining equilibrium analogous to the equilibrium in perfect
competition remains elusive.
As these words are being written, Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq are attempting to forge a
viable government in which the interests of both are taken into account. We do not yet know
2whether they will be able to do so. If the argument in this paper is correct, the outcome will
depend on something more than a mechanical resolution of competing interests. Comparable, if
less lethal, uncertainties arise every day when the Senate and the House of Representatives pass
distinct versions of a bill and must resolve their differences if a final bill is to emerge, and when
proportional representation requires political parties to form a majority coalition. Recall
Duverger’s “law” that first-past-the-post and proportional representation differ in the timing of
the bargaining required, within political parties before the election in the one case and between
political parties after the election in the other. Some time ago in Canada, two rival conservative
parties, the Progressive Conservatives and the Alliance, merged into a single Conservative Party
which is now the largest party in Parliament. The terms of that merger had to be confined within
limits beyond which it was not in the interest of one or the other party to go. Within those limits,
the organization of the new party had to be negotiated with nothing analogous to the general
equilibrium of a competitive economy determining what the outcome of such negotiation must
be. Bargaining is the antithesis of equilibrium. It is the last resort when countervailing self-
interest proves inadequate.
This article begins with an exposition of the paradigmatic bargain where two people are
jointly entitled to a pie if and only if they can agree about how large each person’s slice is to be.
The exposition includes a list of assumptions in the paradigmatic bargain and of aspects of actual
bargaining that are postulated away. Then, the innards of bargaining are discussed with emphasis
on the Nash bargaining solution based upon a common sense of fairness and on the Staahl-
Rubinstein bargaining solution based upon an imposed or agreed-upon process. It is argued that
both solutions are too far from bargaining as we know it justify the common presumption that
deals will necessarily be struck. There follows a discussion of ways to allow for a cost of
bargaining; bargaining may be seen as a component of  transaction cost to be minimized in the
choice of laws, or may be represented in a model of conflict based upon on an analogy between
social and physical technology. There is, finally, a comparison of two very different pictures of
bargaining in politics, one showing bargains among legislators and the executive as the
determinate outcome of a postulated bargaining procedure, and the other showing how the
indeterminacy of bargaining protects democracy by blocking the exploitation of minorities by
majorities. There are two appendices. The first is a simple proof of the Staahl-Rubinstein
bargaining solution, including a discussion of the implications of variations in the assumptions.
The second presents examples of bargaining assumptions in business, law, politics and war. .
The words in the title of this paper are used somewhat idiosyncratically. “Bargain” can be
a verb or a noun. It may refer to the seeking of an agreement or to the terms of the agreement
3itself. The emphasis here is upon the latter, upon bargaining as compromise or voluntary
accommodation of partly-conflicting interests. “Explain” is confined to the economist’s usage of
the word in which a social outcome is explained by showing how that outcome arises when
everybody acts in his own material interest, confined only by market-wide prices or by society-
wide rules. To say, for example, that people vote from a sense of duty is not an explanation in
this narrow sense of the term, despite the fact that the statement may well be true. To say that
bargaining is unexplained is not to deny that bargains are struck or that bargaining is determinate
within the assumptions of the principal bargaining models. Rather it is to say that the
assumptions required to establish the exact connection between interests and outcomes, and
when bargaining succeeds, are altogether too far from the circumstances of bargaining as we
know it. To label a process as bargaining is not to make it so.
The Paradigmatic Bargain
A bargain is a division of the spoils. Two or more people are entitled to something
collectively, but they cannot appropriate or make use of it until they agree about how it is to be
shared. Bargaining may be over the allocation of things or of money. A bargain must make all
participants better off than if no bargain were struck, but a conflict of interest remains, for a
particular allocation must be chosen from the set of all possible allocations, some relatively
advantageous to one party, some relatively advantageous to others.
The paradigmatic bargain is illustrated in Figure 1. Two people, E and O, bargain over the
sharing of a sum of money, P (mnemonic for pie). The money is disbursed to the bargainers if
and when they come to an agreement about how much of the money each is to receive. Without
such an agreement, the money is not disbursed at all. The bargain itself is a mutually agreed-upon
E assignment of shares. The  income, Y , of person E is shown on the vertical axis, and the income,
O Y , of person O is shown on the horizontal axis. Prior to the bargain or if the  bargainers fail to
E   O ,  reach an agreement,  the incomes of the bargainers are Y and  Y  represented by the point á ,
called the no-agreement point. 
A bargain is an agreed-upon assignment of a share s of the pie to person E and a share (1-
E E s) to person O, raising person E’s income from Y  to Y  + sP  raising person O’s income from 
O O Y   to Y   + (1-s) P .  All feasible pairs of post-bargaining incomes are represented by points on
E O the downward-sloping line cutting both axes at a distance Y  + Y  + P from the origin of the
figure. Points at which both bargainers are better off are contained in the segment of that line
4between â and ä. The chosen bargain is represented by the point ã. An increase in s  moves ã
toward â, and a decrease in s moves ã toward ä. 
Figure 1: The Paradigmatic Bargain
The paradigmatic bargain in Figure 1 captures central features in all bargaining. Some
implicit assumptions and possible extension will prove important. 
i) Surrounding Property Rights: In principle, the entire national income might be
allocated among people in one vast bargain, but actual bargaining is almost always circumscribed
by property rights that all bargainers are presumed to respect. Bargains bridge the gaps in
property rights, converting joint ownership of the pie over which people bargain into single
ownership by each person of his agreed-upon slice. Bargaining requires a prior agreement about
who is (and who is not) entitled to a share of the pie, a recognition of the bargainers’ untouchable
property rights apart from the object of the bargain, and an understanding that the deal is final, so
that no bargainer can return to the table demanding a portion of  another’s agreed-upon share.
Otherwise, a person could appropriate another’s property bit by bit, demanding something and
acquiring a portion of what he demands, over and over again. Specification of property rights is
the business of law and civil rights. One can imaging a specification so complete that there is
5nothing left to bargain about. That is more than can be expected in this imperfect world. What
can be hoped for is that peoples’ rights are well enough defined that bargains are narrowly
framed, with little or no dispute as to who is entitled to bargain and what the bargain is about. 
ii) Utility vs. Money: The bargain in Figure 1 is about the allocation of a sum of money.
Actual bargains may be about the allocation of things - such as territory in international disputes
or parental rights after divorce - that are not tradable at market prices, or about the choice among
alternative rules - such as whether or not one may sleep on park benches - with different impacts
on the different sub-groups of the population. The outcome of bargaining and the specification of
the no-agreement point may only be representable in utils rather than in money. Despite the
ordinality and interpersonal incomparability of utility, models of bargaining have been designed
to yield solutions when tradeoffs between people’s utilities must be taken into account.  
iii) Bargaining Cost: The paradigmatic bargain recognizes no cost of bargaining or
resource-using mechanism by which bargains are struck. Actual bargaining may be different. At a
minimum, bargaining takes time that could otherwise be devoted to the production of things
rather than of deals. There may be a loss of potential profit until a deal is struck. Bargaining may
break down altogether, destroying the pie over which bargaining takes place. It is not clear where
to draw the line between the cost of bargaining and the cost of not bargaining as reflected in the
no-agreement point. Nor is it always evident whether bargaining will be quick and easy, or long,
bitter and expensive. It might be supposed that the cost of bargaining rises with the amount at
stake, but that is not always so. People sometimes strike large bargains inexpensively, while
long-standing and mutually-advantageous associations may be dissolved over trifles.
iv) Bargains about Actions as well as Sharing: A bargain may be about what each
participant must do as well as about the division of the spoils, but only the latter is emphasized in
the paradigmatic bargain in figure 1. For example, an agreement between firms to engage in a
joint venture might specify each firm’s investment of time and money in the project. Recognition
of efforts as well as rewards makes little difference to the bargain as long as promises are sure to
be kept. Problems arise when neither firm can observe the other’s investment or when such
observations are unverifiable in court. Bargains that are mutually advantageous when there is full
observability and verifiability of each party’s actions might cease to be mutually advantageous
otherwise. Forms of industrial organization may vary accordingly.
v) Interpretation of the No-agreement Point: The no-agreement point can be looked upon
as representing the incomes (or expected incomes) of the bargainers as they would be a) if the pie
6over which they bargain did not exist or b) if a dispute that must be resolved one way or another
is in fact resolved by some costly alternative to bargaining. The first possibility is exemplified by
bargaining over the sharing of the profit from a new venture by two parties whose cooperation is
required for the venture to be successful. The second possibility is exemplified by disputes
between neighbours that would have to be resolved by costly litigation if no bargain is struck and
by disputes among nations, with war as the alternative to peaceful negotiation.
vi) A Multiplicity of No-agreement Points: Implicit in the description of the paradigmatic
bargain in Figure 1 is the assumption that everybody’s perception of the no-agreement point is
the same. In practice, that need not be so. Bargainers may disagree about the location of the no-
agreement point and about the size of the pie. They may have private information that they
cannot or are unwilling to share. For example, private settlement may be less costly than resort to
the courts for the resolution of disputes, but “bargaining in the shadow of the law” may be
thwarted if plaintiff and defendant are both relatively optimistic about their prospects in the event
of a trial. Starting from either party’s perceived no-agreement point, there may be a range of
mutually-advantageous bargains, but there need be no commonly-recognized range when
perceptions differ significantly. There may also be an advantage to whichever party gives up on
bargaining first. In conflicts between nations, a first strike advantage may block the way to peace,
even when nations would be better off in expectation if a promise not to strike first were binding. 
   
vii) The Number of Bargainers: Bargaining need not be restricted to two participants. A
group of n people may have the collective right to a pie that cannot be touched until an agreement
is reached assigning each person’s share. With three bargainers - A, B and C - a pie must be
A B  C divided by agreement into three shares, s  , s  and s , where 
A B C s  + s  + s   = 1  (1)
1 2 3 n i    With n bargainers, agreement must be about a set of shares {s  , s  , s  , .......s } where s is the
share of person i. 
As long as agreement requires unanimity, the representation of a three-person bargain
becomes a straightforward three-dimensional extension of Figure 1. The no-agreement point is
lodged in a three-dimensional space, the set of all mutually-advantageous bargains is expanded
from a segment on a line to a triangle on a plane, and the bargaining problem is to agree upon
some point within the triangle. With more than three bargainers, the representation of the
bargaining problem becomes an n-dimensional extension of Figure 1. 
7viii) Coalitions: With more than two bargainers, consent of a majority of bargainers may
be sufficient to cement a deal. With n bargainers, agreement among any m of them may be
sufficient as long as m is at least half the number of bargainers, to avoid situations where two
coalitions are both entitled to impose shares.  The constraint is that n > m > (n +1)/2. There now
emerge two distinct bargaining problems: who forms a coalition with whom, and how the pie is
divided among the members of the coalition. The latter problem is a straightforward extension of
the paradigmatic bargaining problem in figure 1. The former is endemic in majority rule voting. 
If the pie consists of the entire national income and if only a minimal coalition is required
to determine an allocation of the pie, then the bargaining problem is automatically transformed
into the exploitation problem in majority rule voting where a bare majority of the population may
grab the lion’s share of the national income for itself.  Members of the majority coalition may be
bound together by some identifiable characteristic - such as race, ethnicity, geography, religion or
income - or perhaps by nothing more than the prospect of gain from inclusion in a majority
coalition. Such bargaining may also give rise to the classic paradox of voting where every
possible allocation of the pie can be defeated in a pair-wise vote by some other allocation. 
  ix) A Sequence of Bargains: Bargaining today may be influenced by bargains struck
yesterday or by the prospect of new bargains tomorrow. A bargain today may set a precedent or
may influence the location of the no-agreement point in a bargain to come. Precedent is
exemplified by on-going dealings between firms where shares of profit once agreed upon may
persist for a long time. Influence upon the location of no-agreement points in future bargains can
be important in disputes between countries over territory. The more territory a country acquires
today, the stronger it may become tomorrow, and the more it may claim in the next round of
negotiation.  
x) Extrnalities: As described in figure 1, the paradigmatic bargain is beneficial to the
bargainers themselves, but, since nothing is said about the matter, it is implicitly assumed to be of
no consequence one way or another to anybody else. Not all bargains are like that. Bargains may
convey externalities to non-participants. Bargains may therefore be classified as benign,
predatory or neutral according to whether non-participants are helped, harmed or unaffected.
Benign bargains are exemplified by arrangements among scientists with different skills to invent
a new product. Predatory bargains are exemplified by the establishment of cartels designed to
raise the cost of the cartel’s products to the rest of the community. Neutral bargains are
exemplified by wage-setting between workers and employers when outsiders’ incomes are the
same regardless of whether wages are high or low.  
8The Bargaining Presumption
In studies of relations among firms, between employers and employees, among
legislators, between legislature and executive, between disputants deciding whether to go to court
and between countries on the brink of war, it is often supposed that, one way or another, a
bargain will be struck, that some point on the bargaining line of Figure 1 will be agreed upon.
This “bargaining presumption” is typically invoked in at least two distinct contexts: as working
assumptions in models focusing upon something else, and as a background premise in
explanations of why bargaining fails when actual bargaining differs significantly from the
paradigmatic bargain. The first usage is exemplified by Hart’s (1995) assumption that firms split
a verifiable surplus equally as part of an explanation of whether firms doing business with one
another remain entirely separate, establish close working relations or amalgamate into one large
company. It is also exemplified Alesina and Rosenthal’s (1995) postulate that legislators, some
on the left and others on the right, choose policies in between, splitting of the difference between
left and right policy in proportion to the number of legislators on each side. Their postulate is
introduced not for its own sake, but as part of a model explaining, among other things, how
voting for legislators depends on whether or not an election for President is held in the same year.
The other usage is exemplified by Priest and Klein’s  (1984) explanation of why a rational
plaintiff and a rational defendant might fail to avoid the cost of trial by settling their differences
privately. Defendant and plaintiff may differ so much in their assessments of the location of the
no-agreement point that there remains  no common ground on the bargaining line of figure 1.
Fearon (1995) has a similar explanation of the descent into war, but differences in the perceived
location of the no-agreement point may be compounded by a first-strike advantage not accounted
for in the simple paradigmatic bargain.  
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These articles reflect the common presumption, as expressed in the quote from the
Canadian Supreme Court at the beginning of this paper, that people “sitting around a table” can
resolve their differences. This may well be true much of the time. The question to which we now
turn is whether this presumed empirical reality can be explained by bargaining theories analogous
to the model of price-taking in a competitive economy. Would some point on the bargaining line
of Figure 1 be selected in the unmodified circumstances of the paradigmatic bargain? Can we
predict which point that would be?  Do our formal models of bargaining supply independent
grounds for confidence that bargains will, in fact, be struck? 
These models are described in some detail in Appendix B.
1
9Bargaining Models
Implicitly or explicitly, confidence in the determinacy of bargaining  may be bolstered by
the existence of equilibrium in explicit models of bargaining. Three such models will be
examined briefly in turn, models based upon a common sense of fairness, a sequence of
concessions and a prescribed bargaining procedure.   For each, it will be argued that the model,
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though interesting and instructive, does not in the end supply the confidence we seek. 
A) A Shared Sense of What is Fair.
Begin with the working assumption (to be examined presently) that, for the simple
paradigmatic bargain over the apportionment of a fixed sum of money between two people, a
“fair” bargain is a fifty-fifty split. Even so, the notion of fairness would be vague and perhaps of
little use unless it could be extended in some natural way from bargaining over dollars to
bargaining over the apportionment of things - like family heirlooms or authority over children in
the event of divorce - for which there are no well-specified market prices. Sometimes people’s
gains from a bargain can only be represented as utilities. Utility supplants money as the object of
bargaining when a sense of fairness leads bargainers to take account of disparities in their
incomes.  
The difficulty in bargaining about utilities is that utility is ordinal, defined up to a linear
transformation, and not comparable from one person to the next. For bargaining over a sum of
E O money, P, it is commonly supposed that a fair bargain is a fifty-fifty split, with ÄY  =  ÄY  
E O where ÄY  = sP and ÄY  = (1-s)P so that person E’s share, s, of the pie is exactly one half.
Similarly, in bargaining is over the assignment of utilities, we would like to equate Äu  and Äu
E O
E where Äu  is the impact of the bargain on the utility, u (Y ), of person E and Äu  is the impact of
E E O
O the bargain on the utility, u (Y ), of person O. We would like to define a fair division of the pie
O
as one for which Äu  = Äu  
E O
E E where  Äu  = [u (Y   + sP) - u (Y )] (4)
E E E
O O Äu  = [u (Y   + (1 - s)P) - u (Y )] (5)
O O O
For an excellent  survey of contemporary bargaining theory, see Muthoo, (1999), and for
2
useful collection of earlier literature, see Young (1975). See also Harsanyi (1956)
10E E and where Y   and Y   are incomes of persons E and O as they were prior to the bargain. That is
not feasible because utilities are incommensurate. The resulting value of s would be affected by a
linear transformation of either utility function. 
There is a way around this difficulty, leading to a rule called the Nash bargaining solution
E O E O (Nash, 1950). Whenever ÄY  is equal to ÄY , the product  ÄY  ÄY  is automatically maximized
E O subject to the constraint that ÄY  + ÄY  = P, and the product s(1 - s) is maximized as well. This
property of fair allocation can be extended from income to utility even though the simple equality
of shares cannot. The Nash bargaining solution is to choose s to maximize the product 
E E O )  O  Äu  Äu  = [u (Y   + s P) - u (Y )] [u (Y   + (1 - s P) - u ( Y )] (6)
E O E E O O
yielding a value of s that is independent of a linear transformation of either utility function and
that equals ½  - a 50-50 split of the pie - whenever both utilities are linear functions of income.
The Nash bargaining solution is a theorem derived, like all theorems, from a set of
axioms. In high school geometry, axioms were presented as “self-evident truths”. In the social
sciences, we have no such luxury. Our axioms must be substantive, and theorems can be no
stronger than the axioms from which they are derived. Among Nash’s axioms is this: “If S is
1 2 1 2 symmetric and u  and u  display this then c(S) must lie on the line u  = u  .” (axiom # 8 ) where S
is the set of all possible outcomes and c(S) is the set of all possible fair outcomes. All by itself,
Nash’s axiom #8 mandates a fifty-fifty split of the pie in the simple paradigmatic bargain or
whenever utility is proportional to income. Nash’s program is to extend the notion of fair
allocation from money to utils, but not to justify the fair allocation itself. Bargainers who for one
reason or another refuse to accept a fifty-fifty split as a fair allocation of the pie - bargainers who
do not conform to axiom #8 - would have no difficulty in refusing to accept the shares assigned
in the Nash bargaining solution.
 The Nash bargaining solution is redistributive - assigning the larger slice to the person
with the smaller income - if bargainers’ utility of income functions are the same and if the
common utility of income function is concave, but the Nash bargaining solution is not always
redistributive.   Also, to agree on an allocation of the pie in accordance with the Nash bargaining
3
Suppose i) that persons E and O are bargaining over the allocation of $P, ii) that their
3
E E O O E O utility functions are U  =(Y )  and U  = (Y ) where Y  and Y  are their incomes, and iii) that, to
½
11solution, bargainers would need to know one another’s utility of income functions. Without such
knowledge, a resort to a fifty-fifty split might be the only feasible procedure. 
For bargains over the allocation of money, a fifty-fifty split might be acceptable not just
because it is fair, but because it is a focal point, the only readily-recognizable rule. If a fifty-fifty
split were customary, then all bargainers would know exactly what to do. A general convention
that people in a dispute ought to split the difference evenly would be relatively easy for
everybody to follow. Other conventions would be difficult to maintain. For instance, a
convention supplying two-thirds of the pie to person E and the remaining third to person O is
meaningless without a prior understanding about who is to play the role of person E and who is to
play the role of person O.  Perhaps such a convention might be founded on class structure, but
that would require a substantial modification of the assumptions about the paradigmatic bargain
in Figure 1. 
A convention to divide the pie equally might be enforced by an understanding that
anybody who deviates from the convention will be punished not by the state as one would be
punished for robbery, but by his fellow citizens who would refuse to deal with him again.  On the
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other hand, a convention enforced by sanction is the antithesis of what most people would think
of as a bargain. There is a sense in which a law punishing people for robbery can be seen as a
nation-wide convention not to steal, but such a convention is not a bargain in the sense described
in Figure 1. Nor is a convention punishing people by ostracism for refusing to accept an equal
division of the pie. Bargaining only takes place in the absence of coercion.
There are two incentive problems. The first has to do with the creation of disputes. If
disputes are to be resolved by a fifty-fifty split of the pie, it becomes in everybody’s interest to
create disputes at other people’s expense. I assert that a third of what you claim to be your land is
really mine, and we agree that I get one sixth. A state of affairs where what anybody chooses to
call a dispute is resolved by a fifty-fifty split is untenable in the long run. The moral of the story,
as already mentioned in the discussion of the paradigmatic bargain, is that the notion of a fair
keep the arithmetic simple, the initial income of person E is 0. On these assumptions, the value
of  Äu  Äu  in equation (13) reduces to [(s P)  ][(1 - s)P] which is maximized when s = 1/3. The
E O ½
fair share of person E is either ½ or 1/3 depending on whether fairness is defined with reference
to dollars or to utils. This is true despite the fact that person E could well be very much less well
off than person O.
Such a mechanism is analyzed by Axelrod (1984).
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12bargain is meaningless except in a context of well-established property rights. A bargain to split
what is initially jointly-owned or collective property may be fair. A bargain to split what is
initially your exclusive property is automatically unfair. Unfortunately, the line between
individually-owned and collectively-owned property is not always as sharp as we would like.
Disputes over the redistribution of income can be framed as being between people who see the
present distribution of property as inviolate and people who see the present distribution of
property as the residue of ancient theft or who look upon the entire national income as collective
property to be allocated in the service of the common good. 
The other problem has to do with bargainers’ motivation. When we speak of “explaining”
bargains, what we really have in mind is a bargaining outcome comparable to the outcome in
general equilibrium in competitive markets where people act in their own interest exclusively,
responding to market-determined prices but not to one another. Nobody in perfect competition is
“fair”. Everybody is unremittingly greedy, cooperating with others if and only if it is personally
advantageous to do so. To accept a fair bargain because it is fair is a different order of behaviour
altogether. It is the incorporation of uncoerced good-will into the core of the market. It is an
admission of failure in the great project of explaining outcomes in the economy by self-interest
alone. Indeed, if people could be relied upon to be “fair” voluntarily, the market itself might
prove unnecessary except perhaps to identify each person’s appropriate behaviour in any given
situation.
Genuine bargaining is, almost by definition, indeterminate. A bargain is the resolution of
a dispute. If bargainers can be relied upon to respect a notion of fairness, to agree on a fifty-fifty
split of the pie, or to accept shares mandated by the Nash bargaining solution, then bargaining is
just playacting, for there is no real dispute and nothing left to bargain about. 
B) A Sequence of Concessions
In the early nineteen-thirties, Hicks (1932) and Zeuthen (1930) developed models of
bargaining between companies and unions when both have a degree of monopoly power.
Bargaining in these models consisted of a series of concessions dependent on the harm to each
party from a failure to agree and upon each party’s judgment of the likelihood that the other
would concede instead.  Hicks draws what he calls an “employer’s concession curve” and a
“union’s resistance curve”. The crossing of these curves identifies the agreed-upon wage. In the
Zeuthen model, the failure of employees and owners to agree leads to “conflict”, the exact
meaning of which is not spelled out in detail. Zeuthen’s principal assumption is that each
13bargainer’s concession to the other is proportional to his  expected harm from conflict as it would
be if antagonism between the bargainers rises to the point where the entire pie is wasted through a
failure to agree. 
Both models allocate the surplus in proportion to harms that do not actually occur because
they are averted by timely concessions. Strikes in Hick’s model are imagined strikes.  Conflict in
Zeuthen’s model is imagined conflict. Neither model contains an explanation of when, if at all,
bargaining breaks down and the unfortunate alternative to agreement is realized.  Nor is it
explained how bargaining in the midst of a strike or bargaining in the midst of conflict differs
from bargaining in anticipation of these events.  Neither party is bloody-minded, insisting on
favourable terms come hell or high water.  This consideration is especially problematic
because, if one bargainer is really and truly adamant, it is usually in the interest of the other party
to back down. More will be said about this presently.  Bargaining is made determinate within
these models, but only by ignoring essential features of the world where bargains are struck.
There is no satisfactory explanation of the timing and the magnitude of concessions, and no
allowance for the possibility that the final agreement is conditioned by the history of bidding as
well as by the initial values of the bargainers’ harms from conflict.
Genuine concessions are modeled by Cross (1965).  Both parties’ concessions are
rendered determinate by the principle that delay is costly so that, if you do not concede quickly,
then I must. At least three kinds of harm might be identified. a) loss by both parties of what
would otherwise be their shares of the pie, b) delay which may be more costly for one party than
for another depending on their rates of discount, and c) actual harm inflicted as when a labour
union goes on strike or when the firm locks out its employees. Cross attempts to derive the
sequence of concessions as the outcome of rational, self-interested behaviour, transporting this
aspect of bargaining from the domain of psychology - where people may act stubbornly,
vindictively or irrationally - into the domain of economics - where each person does what is best
for himself in the light of his best guess of what others will do.  Yet the model contains no
persuasive explanation of why bargainers do not proceed to the ultimate deal all at once if the
ultimate deal is predictable from the initial conditions, as Cross assumes it to be. 
In the light of subsequent literature, these models would seem to be open to the objection
that the bargainers are neither entirely fair-minded, as in the Nash bargaining solution, nor
entirely self-interested in any rational and calculating way. Bargainers are seen as making
concessions, but their concessions do not arise naturally from the maximization of an objective
function in response to given constraints. It is difficult to decide how much weight to attach to
14this objection. Want of strict rationality may account for the eclipse of these models in economic
literature, but, in their defense, it may be argued that bargaining is not really as rational a process
as more recent models would suggest.
C) Mutually-agreed upon Procedures 
A bargaining solution may arise not just from a common sense of fairness or as the
outcome of a sequence of concessions, but as the outcome of a prescribed sequence of alternating
offers by one party to be accepted or rejected by the other.
Begin with the simplest possible case. Persons E and O are bargaining over the allocation
of a pie that emerges just for an instant and disappears if it is not shared at once. The pie appears
for just long enough for one person say, “I offer you such-and-such a share and I will take the
rest.”, and for the other person to reply either “yes” or “no”. No other speech is admitted.
Suppose, no matter why, it is person O who is entitled to make the offer. If the person E’s
response is “yes”, the pie is shared accordingly. If person E’s response is “no”, the pie vanishes
and nobody gets anything. 
It is obvious what happens. As long as both parties are super-rational, person O offers
person E a penny, keeping all the rest of the pie for himself. Recognizing that a penny is better
than nothing, person E accepts the offer, and the pie is allocated accordingly. If the original pie
was $100, person E ends up with one penny and person O ends up with $99.99. In effect, the
person entitled to make the take-it-or-leave-it offer gets to keep the entire pie. 
If that seems a bit harsh, and much too far from anything we would ordinarily call
bargaining, we can even out the allocation by allowing the pie to disappear over two time periods
rather than just one. Suppose that i) the pie appears at sunrise of day 1 and disappears in two
stages, half at sunset on day 1 and the other half at sunset on day 2, ii) offers to share of the pie
(or what remains of it when the offer is made) are at noon each day, by person O on day 1 and, if
person O’s offer is rejected, by person E on day 2, iii) every offer is an assignment of shares, 
iv) the recipient of an offer is made must accept or reject it immediately, v) nothing else may be
said by either person and vi) (an assumption soon to be relaxed) there is no discounting of future
income.
Again it is obvious what must happen. At noon on day 1, person O offers person E half
the pie, and person E accepts. Why? If person E rejected person O’s offer on day 1, the most
15person E could expect would be half the original pie because nothing more would be left on day 2
when it is person E’s turn to make an offer. Except for the switch in roles and the size of the pie,
both parties find themselves in the same situation at noon on day 2 as in the one period take-it-or-
leave-it bargain, and they act accordingly. Since person E can assure himself half of the pie (less
a penny) by waiting until his turn to make an offer comes round, he would never accept less than
half of the pie in any offer from person O on day 1, and person O has no incentive to offer more. 
There is, of course, nothing inevitable about the equal sharing of the pie or about the
restriction of bargaining to two periods. The pie may disappear over any number of days, and the
disappearances each day need not be the same. Suppose the pie diminishes over four days: 1/10 at
sunset on day 1, 2/10 at sunset on day 2, 3/10 at sunset on day 3 and the remaining 4/10 at sunset
on day  4. If so, then at noon on day 1, person O offers 3/5 of the pie [2/10 plus 4/10] to person E,
leaving the remaining 2/5 of the pie [1/10 plus 3/10] for himself, and person E accepts. Person O
would accept nothing less. Person E need offer nothing more. The logic of this allocations is
backward induction. 
Begin by supposing that no deal has been struck by noon on day 4, the last day when any
of the pie remains. Since the day 4 is an even day, it is person E’s turn to make an offer. As in the
one period case, person E offers just a penny to person O, keeping the remainder - which is only
4/10 of the original pie - for himself. Now step backward from the day 4 to day 3 when 7/10 of
the pie remains and when person O is entitled to make the offer. Person O cannot expect person E
to accept anything less than 4/10 of the pie, for that is what person E could acquire by waiting for
his turn to make an offer, but person O need not offer more. Person O offers 4/10 of the pie to
person E, keeping the remaining 3/10 of the pie for himself.  Step backward one more day to day
2 when 9/10 of the pie remains and person E is entitled to make the offer. Person E cannot expect
person O to accept anything less than 3/10 of the pie, for that is what person O could acquire by
waiting, but person E need not offer more. Person E offers 3/10 of the pie to person O, and keeps
the remaining 6/10 of the pie for himself.  Finally, person O is entitled to make the offer in day 1
before any of the pie has vanished. Person O cannot expect person E to accept anything less than
6/10 of the pie which is what person E could acquire by waiting, but person O need not offer
more. Person O offers 6/10 of the pie to person E, keeping the remaining 4/10 of the pie for
himself.   
When the pie diminishes over a number of days, each bargainer captures the sum of the
diminutions of the pie on the evenings of all the days when he is entitled to make the offer.
Person E obtains a slice equal to the sum of the diminutions in all even-numbered days, and
16person O obtains a slice equal to the sum of the diminutions on all odd-numbered days. 
Generalizing slightly, when time is graduated in years rather than days, when a pie of size
P diminishes spontaneously over the course of n years, when person E is entitled to make an offer
in all even years and when person O is entitled to make an offer in all odd years, then an
E  acceptable offer would be made in the very first year of bargaining with a slice P  to person E
O  and a slice P  to person O where  
E t O t E  O P  = 3 p           and      P  = 3 p and   P  + P  = P (7) 
      t even                     t odd
 
t E O where p is the size of the slice of the pie that disappears on the t  year and where P  and P  must
th
sum to P. This is an equilibrium bargain because it is in the interest for each person to accept a
share of the pie equal to the sum of the disappearances on all of the times when he would be
entitled to make the take-it-or-leave-it offer. None of the pie is lost in the process of bargaining
because the bargain is struck in the of the first year before any of the pie has disappeared. 
   An interesting extension of this model replaces disappearance by discounting. Suppose
that i) the pie over which people bargain lasts undiminished forever, or would do so unless a
bargain is struck, but ii) the bargainers value present income over future income, each in
accordance with his own rate of discount, and iii) each bargainer is entitled to make offers in
alternative years. It can be shown that, once again, a bargain is struck as soon as bargaining
begins, but that now the equilibrium shares of the pie are inversely proportional to the bargainers’
discount rates. Specifically, person E’s share becomes 
O E O s =  r  / (r  + r )            (8a)
and person O’s share must be
E E O (1 - s) =  r  / (r  + r )  (8b)
E O where r  and r  are the discount rates of persons E and O. If my discount rate is high, my share of
the pie is correspondingly low. To have a high discount rate is analogous to sacrificing a large
share of the pie if one refuses the other bargainer’s offer, so that one’s equilibrium share of the
17pie is correspondingly reduced.  Equation (8) is called the Staahl-Rubinstein bargaining theorem.  
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A simple, and hopefully intuitive, proof of the theorem is presented as an appendix. 
To induce a deal as soon as bargaining begins, the present value of the pie must be made
to shrink when the deal is delayed. Two equally effective processes have been discussed: physical
contraction over time, and reduction in present value due to discounting. The processes are
analytically similar, but the latter has the distinct advantage that it is based upon the
characteristics of bargainers (their rates of discount) rather than upon the imposed conditions in
which bargaining takes place. Rates of discount are attached to people. Physical shrinkage of the
pie is not. 
The explanation based upon bargainers’ discount rates has serious problems of its own.
As shown in the apppendix, equation (8) is strictly valid as a  bargaining equilibrium if and only
if the bargainers are immortal and the pie lasts forever in the event that no bargain is struck. The
Staahl-Rubinstein bargaining solution requires that bargainers E and O must be prepared to carry
on making offer and counter-offer in the year 3009 if no agreement had been reached before that
date. Without that assumption, equation (8) is just an approximation, though it becomes more and
more accurate the longer the time before the pie finally disintegrates.
Nothing so extreme is required for the explanation based on physical diminution of the
pie. Bargaining opportunities arise from time to time, and then disappear.  In business and
politics, it is rare for today’s opportunities to remain available in five years time, and it is not
unreasonable to suppose that physical shrinkage of the pie might have more impact on the
outcome of bargains than bargainers’ rates of discount. 
The combined effect of shrinkage of the pie and discounting by bargainers is easy enough
to compute. Consider a “bargaining” regime with alternating offers beginning in the year 0 and
continuing up to the year T , where, for convenience, T is assumed to be even. If no deal has been
struck by the year T, there is an arbitrarily-imposed apportionment in that year with a share S to
person E and a share (1 - S) to person O . It is shown in the appendix that a bargain is struck
immediately in the very first year of bargaining, with  a share s(0) to person E, where (to a first
approximation and abstracting from a small first-mover advantage)
The earliest bargaining solution of this type was proposed by Ingolf Staahl (1972).  A
5
more tractable form of the model was proposed by Ariel Rubinstein (1982). For a short and
simple demonstration of the Staahl-Rubinstein bargaining model, see Sutton (1986). For a
thorough treatment of the subject, see Osborne and Rubinstein, (1990).
18O E O s(0) = (1  - z)[r  /(r   +  r  )]  + zS (9)
E O and where  z = [{1/( 1 + r  )}{1/(1 + r }]   (10)
(T - 1)/2
It follows immediately from equation (9) that person E’s share varies steadily from S when T = 0
O E O to r  /{r   +  r }, which is the Staahl-Rubinstein bargaining solution, when T approaches infinity.
Person E’s share is a weighted average of what it would be if bargainers did not discount future
income and what it would be with discounting in circumstances where the pie lasts undiminished
forever unless a deal is struck.
Suppose, for example, that the pie is divided equally (S = ½) in the eighth year unless a
E deal is struck beforehand (i.e. T = 8), that person E’s discount rate is 9% (r  =.09) and that person
O O’s discount rate is 1% (r  = .01). If so, the pie is allocated by common consent in the year 0,
with a share of 38.6% to person E and the remaining 41.4% to person O. In the year 0, person E
would offer person O a share of 41.4% and person E would accept. By contrast, if the pie would
remain undiminished forever, person E’s share would be only 10% in accordance with the pure
Staahl- Rubinstein bargaining solution in equation (8) or in equation (9) as T approaches infinity.
Person E’s share of 38.6% in this deal is much closer to the 50% he would obtain if the
bargainers did not discount future income than the 10% he would obtain if bargainers discounted
future income but the pie lasted forever. One example proves nothing, but it does highlight the
significance of the assumption in the Staahl -Rubinstein model that the pie remains
undiminished, and ready to be allocated, forever unless some bargain is struck.    
An equilibrium bargain can be computed for any arbitrarily-assigned pattern of
disappearance of the pie or apportionment of the pie between bargainers at an assigned time some
years ahead. What cannot be altered if there is to be an equilibrium at all is the imposed sequence
of offers to be accepted or rejected by the other party. Nothing works unless bargainers respect
the required sequence of speech. The procedure itself  may be agreed-upon by bargainers or
externally-imposed. If the procedure originates from a prior agreement between the bargainers,
and in so far as its outcome may be predicted from the characteristics of the bargainers and of the
procedure itself, then the outcome of bargaining is foretold in the chosen procedure, and there is
really nothing to bargain about. What we are calling bargaining would, once again, be play-
acting, with no real give and take between bargainers, and there would be is some question about
whether what is being called bargaining theory is really about bargaining at all. Nor would the
procedure correspond to what we normally think of as a bargain if the procedure were externally
imposed, for, once again, the outcome of bargaining would be pre-determined before the
19bargainers ever meet. 
D) Conversations and Threats
Whatever else it may be, bargaining is a conversation. Bargainers talk to one another,
make offers, tell stories about why their offers ought to be accepted, appeal to one another’s sense
of fairness, reject offers, and so on. The model of bargaining as fair division ignores this aspect of
bargaining altogether, for outcomes emerge directly from the initial conditions with no room for
speech at all. The Staahl-Rubinstein solution acquires a certain plausibility from its resemblance
to conversation, but the conversation is artificial in two respects: It is artificial because, as
discussed above, the equilibrium deal is struck before any actual conversation takes place. It is
also artificial because bargainers are severely restricted in what they can say and when they can
say it. Speech is limited to three, and only three, utterances:“I offer ...”, “Yes” and “No”, with a 
switch in the bargainers’ roles at each stage of the conversation, until a deal is struck. There is a
prescribed spacing between utterances and a prescribed order of speech, neither of which are to
be found in actual conversation or negotiation between firms, between employer and employees 
or between the buyer and seller of a house. 
Actual bargaining is far less orderly and coherent than the model would suggest. There is
no fixed order of speech. People interrupt one another. People try to persuade one another of their
good faith and of their unwillingness to accept one penny less than some offered amount.  Ex
post, negotiation may have been a sequence of offers, first by one person, then by the other. Ex
ante, there is no prescribed order of speech, no restriction on the content of speech and, most
importantly, no prescribed time between utterances.  And it is the ex ante sequence, or absence of
sequence, that matters in actual bargaining. Nobody  enforces the prescribed sequence of offers or
the rule of silence in the intervals between one offer and the next.  Talk is unrestricted.  There are
in practice no gags, and, without gags, it is virtually impossible to predict what the outcome of
bargaining will be. The ordering of speech in the Staahl-Rubinstein model is more than a
convenient simplification. It is an essential part of the model without which the model falls apart
completely. 
More importantly, the key assumption in the Staahl-Rubinstein bargaining solution - an
assumption without which the solution breaks down completely - is “sub-game perfection”: that
bargainers cannot promise today to act tomorrow in a way that will not be in their interest when
tomorrow comes. What this amounts to is the total banishment from the model of promises and
threats. Suppose, for example, that the equilibrium bargain under the Staahl-Rubinstein
20procedure supplies 10% of the pie to person E and the remaining 90% to person O. By contrast,
as long as person O is rational and if person E can commit himself while person O cannot, person
E can appropriate any share of the pie - say 60% - by committing himself  to accept nothing less.
Person E might make the commitment binding by means of a side contract with a third party to
pay the third party a substantial sum if he accepts less than 60% of the pie in his bargain with
person O. Person O must give way, for the alternative is to lose the entire pie and to acquire
nothing. To be sure, person E has no monopoly on threats.  If person E can make threats backed
up by side contracts or by a need to preserve his reputation as a tough and astute bargainer, then
so too can person O. If they threaten one another and if their threats are incompatible, adding up
to more than the value of the pie to be shared, there can be no agreement and both end up with
nothing.  
Risk of failure makes bargainers cautious but does not abolish threats altogether. 
Abandon the rigid sequence, and the outcome of bargaining comes to depend on who gets to
make the first threat, on the credibility of threats, on the parties’ concern for their reputations, on
how stubborn they choose to be. Abandon the rigid sequence, and the neat bargaining equilibrium
disintegrates. The postulate of sub-game perfection preserves the sequence automatically.  There
may be times when this postulate is reasonable and accurate, but there are surely other times
when it is not.  Bargainers may have an incentive to hang tough, to “make yourself into a force of
nature”. Adolph Hitler is alleged to have said while bargaining that “one of us has got to be
reasonable, and it isn’t going to be Hitler.”
The locus classicus on threats and blackmail is Schelling (1956). It is not, strictly-
speaking, a theory of bargaining, for it supplies no formal prediction of how shares of a pie will
actually be allocated among the claimants.  The article is an examination of relevant
considerations, placing considerable stress on commitment and on the importance of  binding 
oneself to refuse anything less than some large share of the pie. Perhaps, the lion’s share of the
pie goes to whoever is the first to commit himself and to communicate that commitment to the
other bargainer, but it is virtually impossible to say a priori who that will turn out to be.   
Concern for reputation may influence bargaining in two opposite ways. On the one hand,
you want a reputation for being reasonable and accommodating to induce prospective partners to
join with you in new ventures. Nobody wants to become your partner if you are expected  to be
too rigid whenever conflicts of interest arise. One the other hand, costly intransigence today may
pay off tomorrow as a warning to partners in future bargains that you are tough. Your partners
might be induced to concede to your demands if you acquire a reputation for being stubborn
21enough to resist conceding to their’s. You want to appear soft to prospective partners and hard
afterwards.  The postulate of sequential rationality, or sub-game perfection assumes such
behaviour away. Seduced by the elegance of  these assumptions - possibly even by the
connotations of the words “rationality” and “perfection”, for who can object to anything that is at
once rational and perfect - a vast range of behaviour is swept out of sight.  Schelling’s essay
remains as a corrective, even a reproach, to much of the more recent literature on bargaining.
E) The Production of Bargains
Missing from the paradigmatic bargain in Figure 1, from the Nash bargaining solution and
from the Staahl-Rubinstein bargaining solution, a cost of bargaining may be restored by a
recognition of “transaction cost” or “conflict”, concepts by no means restricted to bargaining but
that can be attached to bargaining in some circumstances and may help to fill a gap in simple
bargaining models. These concepts will be discussed in turn.
The notion of transaction cost is employed extensively in the study of law. Transaction
cost has been defined as encompassing “all those costs that cannot be conceived to exist in a
Robinson Crusoe economy....a spectrum of institutional costs including those of information, of
negotiation, of drawing up and enforcing contracts, of delineating and policing property rights, of
monitoring performance, and of changing institutional arrangements. In short, they comprise all
those costs not directly incurred in the physical process of production.”(Cheung, 1987, 57).
Though transaction cost is distinguished from ordinary cost of production, the reference to “cost”
necessarily implies some analogy with production; inputs of time and resources yield outputs of
transactions, bargains or whatever else the inputs are intended to procure. Minimization of
transaction cost is among the objectives in the choice of laws by the legislature and in the
interpretation of laws by the courts.    Other things equal, the lower transaction cost, the better the
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law must be.The notion of transaction cost is especially useful in the context of bargaining theory
is as a corrective to the presumption, implicitly introduced into bargaining models or derived as a
theorem, that bargaining is costless, dividing the pie without diminishing it at the same time. 
“A doctor chances upon a stranger lying unconscious on the street, treats him, and later
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demands a fee...The cause of the high transaction cost in that case is incapacity. In other cases it
may be time (e.g., the stranger is conscious but bleeding profusely and there is no time to discuss
term). In such cases, the law considers whether, had transaction cost not been prohibitive, the
parties would have come to terms, and if so what (approximately) the terms would be.”(Posner,
1998, 151)
22Useful as it may be for the choice of laws or among forms of industrial organization, the
notion of transaction cost is of little help in explaining how bargains are struck.  It comes
unequipped with mechanism for deciding whether cost is large or small in any particular case.
Legislators passing laws and judges interpreting laws are expected to minimize transaction cost
in circumstances where they must rely on gut feelings or experience in deciding when transaction
cost is likely to be high and when it is likely to be low. That may be the best we can hope for in
this imperfect world, but there remains a nagging suspicion that what is unmeasured in theory
may turn out to be mischievous in practice.
The notion of transaction is divorced from any apportionment among bargainers of
whatever it is they are bargaining about. A doctrine emphasizing the total cost of bargaining
without reference to how the bargain is struck or how the pie is ultimately divided is only half a
theory, and there is some question as to whether one half can be trusted without the other. In
practice, transaction cost may depend on who gets what in the splitting of the pie. We may not
know the cost of splitting the pie until we know how and to whose advantage it is split. 
Though not introduced primarily an an explanation of bargaining, the notion of “conflict”,
as developed by Hirshleifer (1991), captures aspects of bargaining that might otherwise be
overlooked. Unlike transaction cost, which is seen as a given, fixed expenditure in some
bargaining situation, the notion of conflict - an off-shoot of the concept of rent-seeking - allows
each bargainer to enlarge his share of the pie at some cost to himself. The original  rent seeking
problem was the allocation of an import quota among interested importers where a restriction on
total imports lifts the domestic price above the world price, generating a surplus for importers
fortunate enough to receive a share, and where all or part of the potential surplus is dissipated as
would-be quota holders compete for the attention of the government agency entrusted to assign
shares. Rent seeking becomes conflict when the prize, surplus or object of competition is
endogenous. The paradigmatic conflict is outright war with all spoils to the victor, but the
conflict model has been claimed relevant in a range of non-military contexts - labour disputes,
legal disputes and commercial disputes - where people do not actually attack one another and
where bargaining is normally thought of as an integral part of the resolution of disputes.
Formally, conflict differs from rent seeking in that the combined income of the competitors
becomes the prize over which they compete.
23The main ingredient of both models is the “conflict success function” . With only two rent
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seekers (or two contestants), person E and person O, the conflict success function becomes 
  E O s = C(F  , F )      (11)
   where s can be interpreted either as person E’s share of the prize or as person E’s probability of
E O acquiring the entire prize, and where F  and F  (with F mnemonic for fighting) are peoples’
expenditures to augment their shares. For the function C to serve its purpose in this context,
E O person E’s share must be an increasing function of F  and a decreasing function of F  . So
E defined, the conflict success function is a social analogue to the production function. Inputs F
O and F  yield output s.
E O Models of rent seeking and conflict are alike in that  F   and F  are chosen in a Nash
equilibrium, but they differ in the nature of the prize. In rent seeking, the prize is external, a
valuable privilege such as a share of an import quota, apportioned by the government as
influenced by the recipients’ rent-seeking expenditures. In conflict the prize is internal, typically
the participants’ combined income net of their combined cost of struggle to maximize their
shares.
Models of rent-seeking and conflict stand or fall upon the strength of the analogy between
social and physical technology, upon whether a function connecting inputs with output of
bargaining corresponds to something in the economy or is pulled out of thin air. It does not
matter that the form of the ordinary production is chosen arbitrarily (Cobb-Douglas, for example)
because confidence in the existence of some relation between inputs and outputs is warranted by
the laws of physics.  Confidence in the existence of the conflict success function in its original
usage to explain rent seeking rests on the belief that governments offering favours are influenced
by the expenditures of rent-seekers.  Confidence in the existence of the conflict success function
for military expenditure rests on the belief in the existence of more or less predictable laws of
war. Confidence in the existence of a conflict success function for bargaining has no comparable
foundation. Bargains are not constructed like automobiles in accordance with well-recognized
techniques. Some bargains get struck quickly, easily and costlessly. Other bargains only emerge
after costly litigation and delay. Other bargains fail altogether. We have no basis for predicting
An implicit conflict success function was employed in Bush (1972). An explicit function
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was employed by Tullock (1980). The conflict success function was named and more fully
analysed in Hirshleifer (1998). 
24which is which. 
There is also some question about use of the Nash equilibrium. There is said to be a Nash
equilibrium when each person acts on the presumption that other peoples’ actions are what they
are regardless of what he chooses to do. The presumption is entirely reasonable within a
competitive market where each person is a minute part of the whole. It is much less reasonable in
E two-person interactions such as bargaining.  In choosing F , person E is assumed to look upon
O person O’s choice of F  as invariant regardless of how he, person E, chooses to behave. In
O E choosing F , person O is assumed to look upon person E’s choice of F  as invariant regardless of
how he, person O, chooses to behave. Necessary though it may be to generate a determinate
outcome, this assumption is far from innocuous, for each person’s behaviour would normally be
influenced by his assessment of how the other would respond, especially if bargaining is stalled
and a resumption of bargaining might be part of that response. The presumption in ordinary
bargaining that, if I concede a bit, you might concede a bit too is ruled out by the Nash
equilibrium and has no counterpart in models of rent seeking and conflict. 
There is, finally, some question as to whether rent-seeking and conflict are best seen as an
aspect of  bargaining or as activities that bargainers hope to circumvent. The question is whether -
again with reference to figure 1 -  rent-seeking and conflict are appropriately seen as leading to a
unique point on the bargaining line between â and ä, or as influencing the location of the no-
agreement point, á, from which bargaining begins. Perhaps a distinction can be drawn between
the cost of bargaining  and the cost of conflict when bargaining fails, but the distinction is at best
murky, and a rule would be required for deciding which is which. Extension of the conflict
success function from its core meanings in rent-seeking and in war to the explanation of the cost
of bargaining is at best a useful device for analyzing problems where bargaining is involved, but
it leaves many questions unanswered and contains no real explanation of how bargains are
struck.  
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Conflict models may never have been intended to apply to bargaining. “Conflict, as
8
opposed to mere failure of cooperation, comes about when one or more parties calls upon a
special technology. To wit, a technology where some or all contenders for resources incur cost in
an attempt to weaken or disable competitors. This definition is broad enough to encompass not
only war but strikes and lockouts, lawsuits, sibling rivalries within families and redistributive
politics. But, for concreteness here, I use military language.” (Hirshleifer, 1991, page130).
25Bargaining, Voting and Parliamentary Procedure
Bargaining is a greater impediment in politics than in the economy. If two businessmen
fail to strike a deal, the cost to themselves may be considerable, but the cost to society may be
small because the lost opportunity may be grabbed up by other businessmen instead. Politics is
different. Failure to strike a deal among groups of leftist parties may keep the rightist coalition in
office, radically affecting domestic and foreign policy. Gridlock may the outcome of the failure of
the Senate and the House of Representatives to agree. It is said that Hitler’s rise was made
possible by a bargaining failure among the democratic parties in the Weimar republic. The
economy consists of a large number of organizations each responsible for a small share of the
total output, so that, if one organization breaks down due to a failure of the personnel to agree on
the allocation of rewards, the rest can take up the slack   . By contrast, the government consists of
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a single organization responsible for the production of the entire spectrum of public goods,
creating havoc when that organization fails to run smoothly. Resilience to bargaining failure
should be added to the list of virtues - notably Pareto optimality and the automatic dissemination
of information - of the price mechanism  
It is well-recognized that there may be no equilibrium outcome in majority-rule voting, no
option that beats every other option in a pair-wise vote. Sometimes the available options and the
voters’ preferences among them are such that this “paradox of voting” is avoided, but it is
invariably present in voting about the allocation of the national income as a whole.
Think of a legislature allocating something - perhaps cabinet posts, perhaps the entire
national income - among its members or their constituents. A political equilibrium in this context
is an allocation emerging when each legislator does what is best for himself in the light of what
others are doing.  Suppose, for example, a legislature consisting of just 5 people (the legislators)
is allocating 150 units among its members. The paradox of voting is that each and every
allocation can be defeated by some other allocation in a pair-wise vote. The “fair” allocation {30,
30, 30, 30, 30} can be overturned in majority-rule voting by an unfair allocation, such as (50, 50,
50, 0, 0}, which in turn can be overturned by an allocation such as (60, 0, 0, 45, 45), and so on ad
infinitum. 
In a model of what they call “bargaining in legislatures”, Baron and Frerejohn (1989)
On the confinement of the scope for bargaining in a competitive economy see Newman
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(1965) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1990)
26employ a modification of the  Staahl-Rubinstein bargaining solution to derive an allocation of
“one unit of benefit” in an equilibrium emerging from a combination of random events and self-
interested voting by legislators. Escape from the paradox of voting - and assurance of a
determinate outcome in other contexts as well - is arranged by strengthening the requirements for
the acceptance of a proposal by the legislature. The unattainable ideal of an allocation that can
defeat any other allocation in a pair-wise vote is replaced by the rule that the right to propose an
allocation belongs to a randomly-chosen “formateur” who may propose any allocation he pleases
on the understanding that his choice becomes the decision of the legislature if accepted in an up-
or-down vote, and that, if not, a new formateur is chosen at random in a process repeated as many
times as is necessary until some proposal is accepted. 
Why is this determinate? The allocation by voting of 150 units of something among 5
people has a  “continuation value” of 30 because each of the five people is on the same footing at
any moment prior to the announcement of who the formateur is to be. Suppose the randomly-
chosen formateur turns out to be the third person. Since the continuation value in the event that
the formateur’s offer is turned down is 30, each of the other four people, being rational, must be
prepared to accept any offer in excess of 30. Since any three people constitutes a majority, the
formateur requires only two of the remaining four people to vote for his proposal. Suppose he
offers 31 to each of the first two people and nothing to the fourth and fifth, setting aside the
remaining 88 for himself. His proposal becomes (31,31, 88, 0, 0}. The proposal is adopted by a
three-to-two majority, and that is the end of the story. The allocation of cabinet posts is much the
same as the allocation of money, except that, in the allocation of cabinet posts, the different
number of legislators from the different political parties must be taken into account. As explained
in Baron and Frerejohn (1989), a much less lopsided allocation of national income or of cabinet
posts can be derived through the addition of rules for amendments and for the termination of the
amending process.   
The model is valid in the sense that an equilibrium really does emerge when political
processes are as postulated and when each legislator acts rationally in hisr own self-interest as
economics normally assumes people to do. Doubts may, nonetheless, be raised about the
assumptions. How close are the assumptions to politics as we know it? Does what is described as
bargaining in legislatures correspond to what people normally think of as bargaining? There are
several difficulties.
The alternation of offers in Staahl-Rubinstein bargaining theorem is replaced by a
random selection of offers in the Baron and Frerejohn model. The substitution is significant
27because the alternation of offers has something of the character of a conversation, while random
selection of a formateur retains very little of what most people think of as bargaining. It is closer,
in my opinion, to parliamentary procedure, to implicit or explicit rules surrounding decision-
making by voting about laws or leaders in a context where negotiation has an inextricable role to
play.   
Equally important is the retention of the assumption of “sub-game perfection” which
disposed of Schelling’s stubborn bargainer in the Staahl-Rubinstein bargaining solution. The
assumption is that I cannot promise to act tomorrow in a way that will not be in my interest when
tomorrow comes. But what was stubborn behaviour in the Staahl-Rubinstein formulation of two-
person bargaining becomes simple honesty in deals among legislators. Sub-game perfection
becomes a universal unwillingness or inability to keep one’s word. Without that assumption, a
majority in the legislature can side-line the formateur altogether by agreeing among themselves
on the allocation of the national income, the composition of the cabinet or the policies of the
government in office, and automatically rejecting any offer by a formateur who is not part of the
coalition. Then, as soon as the random process by which formateurs are selected yields a
formateur from the coalition, he proposes the pre-arranged deal and it is approved by a majority
of voters. Parties in the coalition “simply say no” until their deal is finally proposed. Such
binding promises are postulated away by the assumption of sub-game perfect equilibrium, but
eviction from the model is not eviction from politics as actually conducted.
In the example set out above, a coalition of - say - the first three legislators can grab the
entire pie for themselves by promising to vote for the allocation {50, 50, 50, 0, 0} if and only if
members of the coalition can trust one another to vote against any other alternative. If so, any
other allocation would be voted down by a three-to-two majority until such time as a member of
the coalition wins the lottery to become the formateur. If not, the deal would collapse because any
person selected as formateur can make himself better off than he would become by respecting the
agreement. If person 1 becomes the formateur, it would be in the his interest to betray his partners
in the coalition by proposing an allocation of {88, 0, 0, 31, 31} which would be adopted by the
consent of the two legislators who were excluded from the original coalition.
The formateur is a shadowy character who exists in the models without necessarily
existing in the world. He is not necessarily the prime minister. He is not necessarily the Governor
General. He is not necessarily any particular person. He is an artificial construction required to
generate an equilibrium that need not exist in practice if people can make binding promises to
one another and can bargain with one another in the conventional sense of the term.
28“Bargaining in legislatures” can be thought of as part of a larger enterprise, the search for
a  “political equilibrium” comparable to the general equilibrium in the economy. (See, for
instance, Ordershook and Shepsle (1982). This literature includes the probabilistic voting
theorem about platforms of  political parties (Mueller, 2003, chapter 12 and Usher,1995) and the
citizen-candidate model in which politics is confined to the election of a dictator rendered
benevolent because he would not be elected unless his preferences corresponded to those of the
great majority of voters (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996, Besley and Coate, 1997, and Usher, 2005).
The holy grail of this literature is a technical connection between preferences and outcomes
which, if discovered, would remove the need for bargaining altogether. To say that no such
connection has not yet been established is not to say that the search has been in vain. The more
that can be explained by self-interested behaviour within the confines of generally-respected
rules, the less society need rely upon negotiation, and the less likely it becomes that negotiation
breaks down into chaos.
On the other hand, if bargaining in legislatures were as feasible and as determinate as the
Baron and Frerejohn bargaining model might lead one to believe, there would seem to be no
reason why it would be confined to bargaining within the legislature as a whole. If the entire
legislature could agree on an allocation of income among its members, so too could a majority in
the legislature bent upon exploitation of the corresponding minority. Strictly-speaking, the model
is constructed with reference to the entire legislature, but in so far as it can be said to explain
bargaining, it should apply to a faction in the legislature as well. If feasible at all, bargaining
should be equally feasible in both contexts. 
 This consideration places bargaining - and impediments to bargaining - in an entirely
different light. So far, bargaining has been looked upon as desirable in the sense that the
bargainers themselves and society as a whole become better off when bargains are easily struck.
There are circumstances where that is not so. Throughout recorded history, thoughtful people
have doubted whether democracy could ever be made to work. Whatever its merits as an ideal,
government by majority-rule voting was thought to be impossible in practice. Sooner or later,
democracy would self-destruct. A majority of voters would employ its authority over the
government and the army to deprive the corresponding minority of income, property and civil
rights, redirecting income and privilege to members of the majority coalition and, in the end,
eroding the willingness of citizens to accept the will of the majority peacefully.  Anticipating its
fate at the hands of a predatory majority, the minority may rebel, abolishing democracy in the
process. Or, anticipating its fate at the hands of its successors, an unpopular party in office might
use the power of the state to squelch the opposition; better to rule tyrannically than to be
29dominated by a predatory majority in a democratic state. Recognition of a certain validity in the
anti-democratic argument has led political theorists to search for constraints upon predatory
voting and, more importantly, to design institutions that hold predatory majorities in check. Fear
of predatory majorities was a central concern of  the authors of the Constitution of the United
States.
If the model of “bargaining in legislatures” did what it was intended to do - establishing
the existence of a political equilibrium comparable to the equilibrium in a competitive economy -
it would have proved too much, for it is precisely the absence of such a mechanism that is
required as a defense against the exploitation problem. It is hard to see how democracy could be
maintained if bargaining as easy and determinate as the model suggests. Bargaining must at once
difficult enough to block the formation of predatory majorities, but not so difficult as to block
compromise altogether.  
10
Democracy is defended, albeit imperfectly,  against predatory bargaining by the institution
of private property, by the composition of society, by parliamentary procedure and by the design
of government. It is defended by the institution of private property because, other things equal,
democracy is stronger when there is less for legislators to bargain about. Respect for property
rights places a limit on what a minority stands to lose at the ballot box. Property rights are
respected because, and to the extent that, a majority’s gain from the expropriation of the property
of the corresponding minority can be expected to fall short of its loss from the resulting
disorganization of the economy. Not all capitalist societies are democracies, but all democracies
are capitalist, at least to the extent of maintaining private ownership of a significant portion of the
means of production.  The rule of law plays a similar role. A ban on ad hominem legislation (the
11
prohibition of Bills of Attainder in the US Constitution) and on unequal treatment by the courts
places a floor on what one stands to lose if one’s party fails to win the election. Laws must not
reward the supporters of the party in power or punish its enemies. Actual governments violate
this principle to some extent, but there is a limit to how far one can go without placing
democracy in jeopardy. 
 
Democracy is defended by he composition of society in that, as has been recognized since
the beginning of political theorizing in Ancient Greece, predatory bargaining is easier in some
Bargaining in the economy may be predatory too, as in bargaining among monopolists
10
over the proceeds of monopolization.
 On the logic of the connection between voting and capitalism, see Usher (1981).
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30types of society than in others. It is relatively easy in a society composed of a few clearly-
identified races, religions or tribes than in either a very diverse society or a society where people
are much alike. Referring  principally to democracies, Aristotle (1946, 210) wrote that a  “state
cannot be constructed from any chance body of persons....Most of the states that have admitted
persons of another stock.... have been troubled by sedition...”. Voltaire  (quoted in Gordon, 1999,
230.) observed that  “If there were only one religion in England, we should have no fear of
despotism; if there were two, they would cut each other’s throats; but there are thirty, and live in
peace and happiness”. In defense of the new American constitution, James Madison (1789, #51)
observed that  “Whilst all ...will be derived from, and dependant on the society, the society itself
will be broken into many parts, interests and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or
of a minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. ... security of
civil rights...consists... in the multiplicity of interests and.... in the multiplication of sects.” Any
badge separating people into two distinct factions is potentially corruptive. A recognition of this
danger is the basis for the separation of church and state in the Constitution of the United States.
Rabushka and Shepsle, (1972) and Mann (2005) have extended this line of reasoning to the study
of ethnic cleansing.
Disparities in peoples’ incomes may be divisive, but are not necessarily so. Democracy is
unlikely to withstand a bifurcation of society into distinct social classes, one very rich and the
other very poor, for the poor would have every incentive to vote for the expropriation of the rich,
while the rich in turn would have every incentive to abandon democracy to preserve their
privileges. But, with a broad continuum of incomes, the distribution of income may be safely
contracted by progressive income taxation. Unlike exploitation of the adherents of one religion
by the adherents of another, progressive income taxation need pose no threat to democracy
because there is a limit - well short of 100% - to how high a tax it would be in the interest of the
poor to impose. The constraint is deadweight loss in taxation - through the trade-offs between
labour and leisure, between consumption and investment, between tax payment and tax evasion -
causing the tax base to shrink as the tax rate rises, and placing a ceiling on the tax rate it is in
anybody’s interest to impose. Deadweight loss in taxation supplements other impediments to
bargaining in the preservation of democracy.  
Democracy is defended by parliamentary procedure, not just because voting would be
chaotic without  rules specifying legislators’ rights to make proposals and amendments, as well as
the sequence in which proposals and amendments are voted upon in the process of forming
legislation, but because some rules are less threatening than others. For example, the rule
requiring the last vote in any sequence to be between the bill as amended and the status quo
31ensures that whatever the legislature decides does not leave a majority worse off than before
voting began. 
Democracy is defended by the design of government itself: by checks and balances
inherent in the separation of powers among legislature, executive and judiciary as well as in the
duplication of legislatures. This consideration was of great concern to the authors of the
American Constitution. In the words of Thomas Jefferson, “An elective despotism was not the
government we fought for, but one which should not only be founded on free principles but in
which the power of government should be so divided and balanced among the several bodies of
magistracy, as so no one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectively checked and
restrained by the others.” (Madison, 1789, The Federalist Papers #48). “In the compound
republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct
governments, and then the portion allotted to each is subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of people. The different governments
will control each other at the same time as it will be controlled by  itself” (Madison, The
Federalist Papers , #51).
Exploitation of minorities by majorities requires a two-fold bargain. Members of the
majority coalition must recognize one another, and they must agree upon a division of the spoils.
Both requirements become more difficult under the constitutional arrangements that Jefferson
and Madison proposed. With two legislatures, a predatory majority in one may be thwarted by a
different predatory majority (or by the absence of any such majority) in the other. To exploit their
minorities, the two factions would need to compromise. That in itself may be difficult. If
successful, it would be tantamount to the formation of a larger majority in society as a whole with
a correspondingly smaller minority and correspondingly smaller gains from exploitation. Beyond
that, a predatory majority in the legislature may be blocked by the executive or by the judiciary.
Allocation of income and the spoils of office among members of the majority coalition becomes
correspondingly difficult. 
It is at least arguable that the separation of powers - between central and state
governments and between the different houses of the legislature and among president, legislature
and judiciary - is explicitly designed to make government inefficient by requiring consent among
different branches of government if anything constructive is to be done. Constitutions of
democratic countries are designed with bargaining as friction to stop governments from working
too well. None of this would block a  predatory majority if bargaining were as determinate and as
costless as some of our bargaining models would suggest. The division of powers and the
32corresponding checks and balances supports democratic government because and only because
bargaining is costly and indeterminate. The hope is that friction and indeterminacy in bargaining
drive up the cost of exploitation by majority rule voting to the point where the manoeuvre is no
longer advantageous.
Democratic politics is infused with bargaining in two very different ways: Bargaining is
required to fill in the gaps when outcomes under the rules of parliamentary procedure are less
than completely determinate. Bargaining is indispensable when, for instance, committees of the
Senate and the House of representatives come together to forge a common bill in the event that
two somewhat different bills on one and the same subject have been passed in the two houses of
Congress, or when a political party forges a common platform out of the somewhat similar,
somewhat different views of the party supporters. But bargaining is also an essential part of the
process by which a majority in the legislature can employ the power of the vote to exploit the
corresponding minority, directing to itself a disproportionate share of  the national income and 
the fruits of office. A principal objective in the design of democratic government and
parliamentary procedure is to foster one aspect of bargaining and to thwart the other.  
Concluding Observations
The economist’s project is to explain as much as possible of the world as the outcome of
greed. Ideally, a determinate bargaining equilibrium would be identified, comparable to price-
taking in a competitive economy, where each bargainer acts in his own interest in response to
general rules and to characteristics of the economy as a whole, and conditions would be identified
where the bargaining equilibrium is conducive to the common good. The review of bargaining in
this paper suggests that the ideal has not been, and perhaps can never be, attained. 
Propositions about bargaining - like the blind men and the elephant in the old Hindu tale -
are useful half-truths or rules of thumb. Bargainers have a common notion of fair division.
Bargains favour the party with the lower rate of discount. Bargains are costly, but some are  more
costly than others. Bargainers respond to threats and recognize focal points. The smaller the pie
in dispute, the lower bargaining cost is likely to be. Bargaining outcomes reflect the efforts of the
bargainers. None of these assertions is altogether wrong, but they do not fit well together. There
no central switching mechanism assigning particular bargains to one mechanism or another. Nor
is there any mixing process by which the different sketches are combined into a well-drawn
portrait of how bargains are struck. 
33Three closely-connected morals of the story are encapsulated in the quotes at the
beginning of the paper: Bargaining is not adequately explained as a species of self-interested
behaviour subject to society-wide constraints. What is not adequately explained cannot be fully
trusted, hence the need to beware of the common supposition, implicit in the injunction of the
Canadian Supreme court, that people “sitting around the table” can always resolve their disputes.
Laws and customs should be designed, wherever possible, with reliance on self-interest rather
than compromise to get the world’s work done, confining our limited supply of compromise to
matters that cannot be settled any other way.
A fourth moral is about the dual role of bargaining in democratic government. On the one
hand, democracy is distinguished from autocracy - from absolute monarchy and dictatorship - not
just by the institution of voting, but by a much greater reliance on compromise among politicians
with different interests and objectives. Democracy is an amalgam of voting and bargaining. On
the other hand, the rules of voting and the organization of government must be designed to
frustrate or block predatory bargains that would, if unconstrained, lead democracy to self-
destruct. Bargaining as “explained” could not play the double role - as good guy and as bad guy -
that democratic government requires.
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38Appendix A: Derivation of the Staahl-Rubinstein Bargaining Solution
A pie is to be shared by agreement between two people, E and O, both completely rational
and unreservedly greedy, through a prescribed sequence of alternating offers, terminating when
an offer is accepted. There is one, and only one, offer per year. In the first minute of every year t,
one person - person E in even years and person O in odd years - makes an offer assigning a share
s(t) to person E and a share 1 - s(t) to person O. In the second minute, the other person says either
“yes” or “no”. If “yes”, the pie is immediately divided accordingly. If “no”, nothing happens until
the following year when the process is repeated with the roles reversed. 
The Staahl-Rubinstein bargaining solution is an equilibrium determination of shares
E O depending on the persons’ rates of interest, r  for person E and r  for person O. Though
bargaining could go on forever, the very opposite occurs. Whichever person is entitled to make
O O E E O E the first offer proposes a share s(0) = r /(r  + r ) for person E, leaving a share r /(r  + r ) for
person O. The other party accepts. 
The derivation of the Staahl-Rubinstein bargaining solution is based upon a modification
of the longevity assumption. Instead of supposing that the pie last forever in the absence of an
agreement, it is supposed that in some year T a share S is arbitrarily assigned to person  E
(leaving a share 1 - S for person O) if no agreement has been reached by that time. The solution
emerges when T goes to infinity, though a different solution emerges when T is finite. A key
assumption in the proof is sub-game perfection: Advantageous offers are always accepted.
Neither party can promise to refuse any offer of less than some given share if that offer is the best
available at the time it is made. Suppose for convenience that the process begins in the year 0 and
that  T is even, so that person E makes the first offer and the final offer as well.
The proof is by reverse induction. In the year T, person E offers to take a share S, leaving
person O with a share (1 - S). Person O will not take less because (1 - S) is his arbitrarily-
assigned share in the year T, and person E need not offer more. Go back one year to the year T - 1
E when it is person O’s turn to make the offer. His offer, s(T - 1), to person E must be  S/(1 - r ) -
the present value in the year T - 1 of a share S in the year T - leaving person as well off in the
year T - 1 as he would be by waiting for the arbitrary assignment in the year T. Person O’s share
E in the year T- 1 becomes the remainder of the pie, 1 - s(T - 1), equal to 1 -  S/(1 - r ). Now step
back an additional year to T - 2 when person E is again entitled to make the offer. The most that
E O person E need offer person O is [1 -  S/(1 - r )]/(1 - r ) which is the present value of what Person
E could obtain by waiting a year for his turn to make an offer. Person E’s share is the remainder 
39E O s(T - 2) = 1 - [1 -  S/(1 - r )]/(1 - r ) = x + yS (A1)
O O O E where x = r /(1 + r )  and z = 1/(1 + r )(1 + r ). 
From here on the derivation of equilibrium shares in the first offer - made by person E in
the year 0 when the sequence of offers and responses begins, and accepted by person O - is
entirely mechanical. Person E’s share in the year T - 4 bears precisely the relation to his share in
the year T -2 that his share in the year T - 2 bore to his share in the year T, and so on all the way
back to the year 0  Specifically,
s(T - 4) = x + ys(T - 2) = x + z[x + yS] =  x[1 + z] + z S (A2)
2
s(T - 6) = x + zs(T - 4) =  x[1 + z + z ] + z S     (A3)
2 3
and so on, each two years back adding an extra term to the time series in square brackets, until
s(0) =  x[1 + z +zy  +........+ z ] + z S = (1 -  z )[x/(1 - z)]  + z S  (A4)
2  (T /2) - 1 T/2 T/2 T/2
which is a weighted average of [x/(1 - z)] and S, equal to the former when T approaches infinity
and to the latter when T = 0. Note finally that 
O O E O E O E O O E x/(1 - z) = (r  + r  r )/(r  + r  + r  r ) r /(r  + r ) (A5)
where the approximation holds exactly when the “years” are short enough to remove person E’s 
O E first mover advantage. Ignoring r  r , the equilibrium share, s(0), of person E is
O O E s(0) = (1 - z )[r /(r  + r )]  + (z )S  (A6)
T/2 T/2
which is equation (9) in the text. As soon as bargaining begins, person E offers a share 1 - s(0) to
person O, leaving a share s(0) for himself. Person O accepts, and the bargain is struck.  
O E Suppose r  = 1% and r  = 9%. Person E’s share in the Staahl-Rubinstein bargaining
solution is 1/10. Person E’s share rises to 38.6%, in accordance to equation (A6), when an
arbitrary distribution with S = ½  would be imposed in the year 8 (i.e. T = 8) if a deal has not
already been reached. A similar formula could be derived from the assumption that the pie
disintegrates if not already allocated by agreement in some year T.
40Appendix B: Applications of the Bargaining Premise in  Models of Business, Law,                  
                         Politics and the Choice between War and Peace 
Each of the four models described in this appendix starts with the premise that some
bargain would be struck in the circumstances of the paradigmatic bargain as described in figure 1
of the text, and employs that premise to explain some aspect of society. The model of business
shows why the most efficient form of associations between firms may not be adopted. The model
of law explains why parties to a dispute may resort to litigation even though it would be far less
expensive to resolve differences privately. The model of politics shows, among other things, why
the party of the President tends to lose votes in elections for Congress in years when the president
is not up for re election, The model of war shows why war may not be averted by negotiation.   
1) Bargains between Firms 
In Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure, Hart (1995)  explains the pattern of
ownership as a trade off between economies of scale and the loss of incentive when one cannot
reap the full benefit from one’s activities.  Patterns of ownership are exemplified by the relation
between General Motors and the Fisher Body company that makes frames for General Motors’
cars. The question is whether these two companies i) remain entirely separate, buying or selling
from one another or from other companies on the open market, ii) amalgamate into one large
company or iii) establish a close working relation with one another.  The choice among these
options depends upon economies of management and impediments to cooperation when neither
firm can verify the other’s relation-specific investment.   Hart shows that, though the potential
combined profit under cooperation (iii) may exceed the combined profit under amalgamation (ii),
amalgamation may nevertheless be the better option when relation-specific expenditures are
unverifiable. Hart’s model is quite complicated, but a stripped down version is sufficient to focus
on his assumption about bargaining which is our immediate concern. 
Consider two firms, F and G.  If they remain entirely separate from one another, their
F G A profits would be ð  and ð .  If they amalgamate into one large firm, its profit would be ð .  If they
C remain as separate entities but cooperate, their combined profit, ð (f, g), would be dependent
upon their relation-specific investments, f by firm F and g by firm G.  The critical assumption
about the relation-specific investments is that neither firm’s investment is verifiable by the other.
F G Each firm is assumed to know  both firms’ profits, ð  and ð , in the absence of cooperation, the
A C profit, ð , of the amalgamated firm and the profit function, ð  (f, g), of the two firms together in
the event that they cooperate.  Knowing its own relation-specific investment, f or g as the case
41may be, each firm is in a position to infer the relation-specific of the other firm, but it cannot
demonstrate this knowledge objectively to a third party because outsiders cannot be expected to
know f or g. That being so, an agreed-upon rule for apportioning combined profit between the
firms cannot be made to depend upon their relation-specific investments. A distinction is
therefore drawn between the true surplus, T,  from cooperation where  
C F   G T = ð (f, g) - [ð  + ð  ] - f - g (B1)
and the verifiable surplus, S, from cooperation where 
C F   G S =  ð  (f, g) - [ð  + ð  ] (B2) 
Two key behavioural assumptions are introduced: the informational assumption that only
the verifiable surplus can serve as a basis for assigning each firm’s share of the benefit of
cooperation and the bargaining assumption that the two firms split the verifiable surplus, S,
evenly, half to firm F and half to firm G. On these assumption, firm F’s profit in the event of
FC cooperation, ð  where C is mnemonic for cooperation, becomes 
FC F    ð   =  ð   + S/2  - f (B3)
GC and firm G’s profit in the event of cooperation, ð , becomes
 
GC G ð   =  ð   + S/2  - g (B4)
Hart’s main proposition is that, without verification, both relation-specific investments
are too small and the combined profit is less than it might be because both firms invest to
maximize their own surpluses rather than the surplus of the two firms together. It could easily 
happen that - as between amalgamation and cooperation - the total profit of the two firms
together would be higher under cooperation if relation-specific investments could be verified, but
the total profit is actually higher under amalgamation because each firm’s relation-specific
investment is concealed from the other. 
Bargaining failure in this context is manifest in the form of industrial organization. Even
on the assumption that bargainers split the pie evenly where each party’s actions can be observed,
the “wrong” form of industrial organization may be chosen when the firms’ actions are not only
42observable but verifiable by a third party in a position to punish firms for malfeasance.  
2) Settlement to Avoid a Trial
Private disputes can be resolved in court or by a settlement out of court in the light of how
the court might be expected to rule. Whenever the combined cost of settlement, to plaintiff and
defendant together, exceeds the combined cost of trial, one might expect that “bargaining in the
shadow of the law” would displace trials altogether. In “The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation”, Priest and Klein (1984) ask why that is not always so. They begin with two
observations: that 1) about 95% of personal injury cases are settled without going to trial and that
2) among cases that do go to trial, the plaintiff’s success rate is about 50%. Their explanation is
that there must be a major discrepancy between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s expectations of
the court’s decision, coupled with a more or less equal chances that either party is mistaken.
A dispute between plaintiff and defendant can be represented by a variant of figure 1 in
the text. Represented on the axes are not total incomes, but changes in incomes as a consequence
of settlement or trial  The plaintiff’s gain is shown above the origin on the vertical axis. The
defendant’s loss is shown to the left of the origin on the horizontal axis. Increments to income
(which may be positive or negative) take account of i) the court’s mandated transfer of income
from defendant to plaintiff, ii) each person’s legal cost in the event of a trial and iii) each
person’s the cost of settlement. The analysis will be undertaken in three stages. In the first, the
court’s judgment is known in advance to both plaintiff and defendant. In the second, there is a
universally-recognized probability of a judgment for the plaintiff, but the amount of that
judgment is known to both parties. Only in the third stage might plaintiff and defendant have
different expectations about what the probability or the magnitude of the judgment might be.
When the court’s judgment, J, is known in advance, the choice between settlement and
trial is as shown in figure B1. The legal costs of a trial are C  to the plaintiff and C  to the
 p  d
defendant, represented together on the figure by the point C. The costs of arranging a settlement
are S  to the plaintiff and S  to the defendant, represented together on the figure by the point S.
 p  d
Settlement costs are assumed to be very much less than legal costs of a trial, i.e.  S  < C  and 
 p  p
S < C . The diagonal line - at 45 degrees to both axes - through the point C traces out all
 d   d
possible increments to income of plaintiff and defendant when both pay the legal costs  required
for a trial and there is a transfer of income between them. Similarly, the diagonal line through the
point S shows all possible increments to income of plaintiff and defendant when both pay the
required cost of settling the case without a trial and there is a transfer of income between them.
43The horizontal distance, L, between the trial line and the settlement line is (C  + C ) - (S  + S ).
 p  d  p  d
It is the surplus - the sum of both parties’ gains - from settlement rather than trial.
Figure B1: Settlement verses Trial 
If plaintiff and defendant paid the legal cost of trial but the court excused the defendant
from any payment to the plaintiff, the parties would find themselves at the point C. If, instead, the
court required the defendant to pay the plaintiff an amount J, the parties would find themselves at




From here on the story is essentially the same as in figure 1 of the text. A trial brings
plaintiff and defendant to the point ä which is below and to the left of the settlement line, so that
there must be room for a mutually-advantageous deal, moving in the first instance to the point S
on the settlement line and then, via the appropriate transfer, to some point between á and â -
where á is directly above and â is to the right of the point ä - making both parties better off. When
44the court would mandate a payment J from defendant to plaintiff, the defendant would be made
better off by any settlement less than J + (C  - S ) and the plaintiff would be made better off with
 d   d
any settlement greater than J - (C  - S ). If this model were a true and complete representation of
 p   p
the confrontation of plaintiff and defendant and as long as the surplus, L, from settlement is
positive, there need be no civil trials at all, for all disputes could be negotiated away. 
Suppose that it costs nothing to settle disputes privately, that plaintiff and defendant would
both face legal costs of $200 if the case went to trial, and that the defendant would be required to
pay $1,000 to the plaintiff if the case when to court. Is so, any settlement from defendant to
plaintiff of between $800 and $1200 would leave both parties better off than they would be by
going to court. The bargaining premise is that some settlement between these limits would be
chosen. The premise is that a mutually-advantageous settlement would not be blocked because the
parties are too stubborn to reach an agreement. 
Nothing of importance changes when the assumption of a sure judgment J is replaced with
a universally-recognized probability ð of a judgment $ J coupled with a probability (1 -  ð) that the
defendant is deemed by the court not to be liable at all. As long as plaintiff and defendant are risk
neutral, they are in the same position as they would be with a judgment of $ðJ and no risk at all.
Figure B1 and its implications would be unchanged except that J is replaced by ðJ. Once again,
there is a range áâ of mutually-advantageous settlements from which one must be chosen.
Settlement would be expected as long as plaintiff and defendant are not too stubborn.
While not denying that parties may prove to be stubborn, Priest and Klein emphasize a
different reason why a mutually-acceptable settlement might not be reached. Bargaining may fail
because plaintiff and defendant have different expectations about the outcome of a trial. Suppose
the plaintiff expects a large award, the defendant expects something smaller and both expectations
are held with the force of certainty. The plaintiff expects the award to be J  and that the defendant
p
expects the award to be J  , where J  is less than J . There is, of course, no strong reason why
d d p
expectations should not go the other way, with the plaintiff expecting a relatively small reward
and the defendant expecting a relatively large one, but, were that so, both parties would be
especially averse to trial and especially willing to settle, reinforcing the advantage of settlement
when expectations about J are the same.
The pattern of expectations and its influence on the parties’ willingness to settle out of
court is illustrated in Figure B2. Anticipating the larger judgment of J , the plaintiff expects the
p
trial to generate increments to the incomes of plaintiff and defendant as represented by the point
45ä , and, as a consequence of that expectation, would accept no point on the settlement line below
p
and to the right of â . Similarly, anticipating the smaller judgment of J , the defendant expects the
p d
trial to generate increments to the incomes of plaintiff and defendant as represented by the point ä
d
and, as a consequence of that expectation, would accept no point on the settlement line above and
to the left of á .
d
Figure B2: Plaintiff and Defendant are Both Relatively 
   Optimistic about the Magnitude of the Judgment 
As the figure is drawn - with J  very much larger than J   - there is no point on the
p d
settlement line that is at once above â  (and therefore acceptable to the plaintiff) and below á  (and
p d
therefore acceptable to the defendant). There is in short no deal. The parties go to trial despite the
fact a settlement would be mutually-advantageous if only they knew what J would turn out to be. 
Plaintiff and defendant can both expect to be better off by settling out of court as long as
the combined cost saving, (C  + C ) - (S  + S ), exceeds the plaintiff’s optimism, J  - J  , about
 p  d  p  d p  d
the size of the court’s award. Only if the court’s award were common knowledge, would the
46choice depend upon the cost alone. Plaintiff and defendant fail to resolve their dispute without
resort to trial a) if plaintiff and defendant cannot agree upon one among many mutually-
advantageous deals, some more favourable to the plaintiff  and others more favourable to the
defendant, or b) if the plaintiff is so optimistic about his chance of success at trial that there are no
perceived mutually-advantageous settlements. 
Several extensions and qualifications may be of interest;
Expectations may differ about the probability of the award, about its magnitude, or both. If
plaintiff expects an award J  with a probability ð  while defendant expects an award J  with a
p p d
probability ð , then J  and J  in figure B2 must be replaced with ð J , and J  in figure B2 must be
d p p p p d
replaced with ð  J , but everything else remains the same. There is an implicit assumption here of
d d 
risk neutrality. Risk aversion magnifies the advantage of settlement over trial.  
Legal costs, C  and C , have been assumed invariant. It might instead have been assumed
 p  d
that the magnitude or probability of an award is influenced by the amounts parties are willing to
spend to influence these variables. In other words, a rent-seeking model of legal cost might have
been appended to the basic model of settlement and trial. The defendant may be in a position to
deter suits altogether by forcing up the legal cost of the plaintiff to the point where the expected
return to the plaintiff turns negative. Class action suits may then be the plaintiffs’ only recourse.  
It has been assumed so far that J  differs from J  because one or both parties is mistaken
p d
about the true value of J. That is a reasonable assumption to make about accident law which is
primarily what Priest and Klein had in mind. But a difference between J  and J  may be genuine.
p d
One party may really have more to gain from a trial than the other has to lose. In compensation for
injury, a dollar extra to the plaintiff is a dollar extra from the defendant as well, but, in suits over
product liability, the full cost of a trial to the producer may be many times the award to the
plaintiff because such an award may set a precedent for many disputes to come.  A defendant
might prefer settlement to trial if trial sets a precedent, but settlement does not. 
3) Legislature and Executive
In Partisan Politics, Divided Government and the Economy, Alesina and Rosenthal (1995)
consider a society where all political outcomes can be represented by points on a left-right
continuum. Politics is about the choice of a number, x, on a scale from 0 to 1. Every voter has a
favourite position on that scale, and his only concern is to minimize the distance between his
47favourite positions and the political outcome as determined by voting and by bargaining among
politicians elected to office. There are two parties, left and right, with different ideal points on the
continuum.  Preferences of politicians within each political party are the same. All politicians in
L the “left” party have the same first preference x , and all politicians in the “right” party have the
R L R same first preference x , where, of course. x  < x  meaning that the preferred outcome of the
“right” party is to the right of the preferred outcome of the “left” party on the left-right scale. Each
party, if it could have its own way, would arrange a political outcome in accordance with its first
preference. 
Citizens elect legislators and a president. Voting for legislators is by proportional
representation. Citizens vote for parties rather than for legislators directly, and then seats in the
legislature are allocated to the parties in accordance with the number of votes received. 
The final outcome is a point on the left-right continuum, determined simultaneously by
two costless bargains, one within the legislature and another between the legislature and the
Q president. Bargaining within the legislature yields a legislative preference, x  , where   
     
Q L R x  = áx   +  (1-á)x (B5)
L R where x  and x  are the first preferences of the “left” and “right” parties and where á is the left
party’s share of the seats in the legislature. All legislators’ preferences are weighted equally in a
compromise where each party’s political power is proportional to its membership in the
legislature. This is a very strong assumption, for it might have been assumed that the majority
party gets its way completely. Bargaining between the legislature and the executive supplies the
final political outcome, x, where 
Q P x = âx  + (1- â)x (B6)
P L where x  is the first preference of the president (which must be either x  if the president is from
R the “left” party or x   if the president is from the “right” party) and where â, which must lie
between 0 and 1, is the legislature’s bargaining power in its dealings with the president. Nothing
in the model determines the magnitude of â.
The weights á and â are representations of bargaining power, looked upon as unexplained
facts of political life. Within the legislature, each party’s bargaining power is proportional to its
number of seats.  Between legislature and president, bargaining power depends on a parameter
pulled out of thin air. This mode of analysis is wrong or useless, but nor is it grounded upon any
48persuasive explanation of how rational and self-interested people come to agree. Bargaining power
is postulated, not rationalized or explained.
Alesina and Rosenthal’s bargaining postulates are advanced, in my opinion, not as an
accurate depiction of bargaining, as it were, from the inside, but as components of a larger model
of the workings of democratic government and as springboard enabling Alesina and Rosenthal to
develop interesting and insightful propositions about voting in the formation of public policy.
They explain, for example, how rational voters’ choices between Republican and Democratic
candidates for the legislature are influenced by whether the President is Republican or
Democratic. Like any theory, this theory of political behaviour might be verified by the accuracy
of its predictions, but that line of defense is only available if we are not interested in bargaining
per se and as long as we do not allow ourselves, on the strength of the theory, to suppose that
bargaining is more predictable and determinate than is really the case.  
4) Bargaining as an Alternative to War
In “Rational Explanations for War”, Fearon (1995) raises the intriguing question of why
war is not always averted by bargaining, for  “...under broad conditions, the fact that fighting is
costly and risky implies that there should exist negotiated agreements that rationally-led states in
dispute would prefer to war” (p. 409). The article is an account of the circumstances where the
statement may turn out to be false, where war cannot be averted by negotiation and compromise.
The claim is that war cannot be averted when “(1) the combination of private information about
resolve or capability and incentives to misrepresent these, and (2) states’ inability, in specific
circumstances, to commit to uphold a deal.” (P.409) The first of these impediments to bargaining
is exemplified by a situation where leaders in both states believe they have an 80% chance of
winning. The second is exemplified by a situation where both states’ chance of winning a war are
substantially enhanced by striking first and where there is no international policeman to punish
states that break a promise not to do so. Fearon’s development of these propositions will be
reviewed here because they are of interest in their own right but primarily to emphasize a major
premise of the analysis, that, but for these impediments, some bargain from a set of all mutually-
advantageous bargains would always be struck. 
The paradigmatic bargain in Figure 1 can be reconstructed to represent the choice between
negotiated settlement and war. Bargainers E and O become countries, perhaps England and the
Ottoman Empire. Incomes of people become supposedly well-defined utilities of nations. The no-
agreement point becomes the utilities of nations in the event of war. The bargaining range
49becomes a continuum of peaceful outcomes, from the most advantageous for one country to the
most advantageous for the other. The two principal modifications are the transformation of the no-
agreement point to represent expected utilities rather than given incomes, and the distinction
between the no-agreement point and the status quo. Resort to war differs significantly from a mere
absence of agreement, and harmony between nations may be fostered by a status quo. These
modifications will be examined in a reformulation of the bargaining problem in Figure B3. 
Figure B3: Utilities in Bargaining and War
T
he intrinsic uncertainty about the outcome of war converts the no-agreement point into an
expected outcome. War, in this context, is a gamble in which each country’s expected utility is a
weighted average of its probabilities of victory and defeat. If country E wins, its utility becomes
E U (W, v), where W is mnemonic for war and v is mnemonic for victory, and country O’s utility
O becomes U (W,d), where d is mnemonic for defeat. If country O wins, its utility becomes 
O E U (W, v), and country E’s utility becomes U (W,d). As it is always better to win than to lose,
50E E O O U (W, v) > U (W, d) and U (W, v) > U (W, d) as illustrated in the figure. 
If country E’s probability of winning is ð, then its expected utility in the event of war
E becomes U (W, ð) where 
E E E U (W, ð)  = ð U (W, v) + (1-ð)U (W,d)}  (B7)
E E E E and where U (W, ð)  = U (W, v) when ð = 1 and U (W, ð)  = U (W, d) when ð = 0. Essentially
the same relation holds for country O.
O O O U (W,ð)} = (1-ð) U (W, v) + ðU (W,d)} (B8)
For all values of ð from 1 to 0, the countries’ expected utilities can be represented by points on the
E O “war line” in figure B3, a downward sloping straight line from the point {U (W, v), U (W,d)}
E O when ð = 1 to the point {U (W, d), U (W,v)} when ð = 0. For any given value of ð, the utilities of
E O the two countries - U (W, ð) and U (W,ð) - are represented by a point á on the war line. The 
point á plays the role of the no-agreement point in Figure 1, once the opportunities for bargaining
are introduced. 
Since war is harmful while bargaining is not, any outcome on the war line can be bettered
for both countries by a deal to avoid war, but, as in the paradigmatic bargain, such deals are not
unique. All peaceful accommodations are shown on the “bargaining line” in figure B3, a
downward sloping from a point (not labeled) where country O is no better off than if it had lost the
war but country E is better off than if it had won, to a point where country E is no better off than if
it had lost the war but country O is better off than if it had won. For any point such as á on the war
line, there must be a range of points on the bargaining line at which utilities of both countries are
greater than at the point á. 
Not all peaceful allocations are preferable to both nations than the resort to war. When the
nations’ expected utilities in the event of war are represented by the point á, the range of feasible
bargains becomes the portion of the bargaining line from â to ä. At the point â, the entire surplus
accrues to country E, leaving country O just as well off  but E distinctly better off than if there had
been a war. At the point ä, the entire surplus accrues to country O, leaving country E no better off
but country O distinctly better off than if there had been a war. As in Figure 1, the bargaining
problem is to choose a point between  â and ä. 
51The other special feature of bargaining between nations is that there may be a “status quo”
represented in figure B3 by the point ö on the bargaining line. In negotiation between businessmen
over the sharing of profit from a joint venture, the no-agreement point and the status quo were one
and the same. Failure to agree caused a reversion of incomes to whatever they would have been if
the joint venture had never been considered. In dealings between nations, failure to agree
peacefully can leave one or both nations worse off than before. In one case, negotiation takes both
parties from their original position to something better. In the other, negotiation failure takes one
or both parties from their original position to something worse.  
As long as the status quo lies within the range from â to ä, it may serve as a focal point for
peaceful cooperation. War may be averted through mutual recognition of its privileged position on
the bargaining line.  Each country says to the other, “I’ll fight rather than accept any point on the
12
bargaining line other than the status quo itself.” Neither country may be inclined to push for
change, and there is no war. No country would accept a bargain different from the status quo for
fear that it would be pushed, bit by bit, to the wrong edge of the bargaining range - country E to
toward ä and country O toward â - at which peace is no better than the expected outcome of war. 
When potential conflict is over territory, the status quo would be a more or less well-
recognized border that both nations are willing to respect. But respect for a status quo is far from
inevitable. In a dispute about territory, country E may claim ownership because it captured the
territory in the glorious battle of 1362, while country O may claim ownership because it captured
the territory in the glorious battle of 1478. Or disputes between nations may be about matters such
as trade relations or global warming for which there is no prior rule that all nations have been
accustomed to recognize. Or a status quo once recognized may not be recognized forever. It is an
unfortunate characteristic of any status quo that, as illustrated in figure B3, both countries may be
better off ceding some territory to the other - country E moving along the bargaining line toward
the point ä, or country O moving along the bargaining line toward the point â - if the only
alternative to concession is war. One country may simply announce that the old status quo is no
longer acceptable. 
There is another possibility. As illustrated in Figure B4, countries may resort to war
because they differ in their assessments of the prospect of victory. It was assumed in the
construction of figure B3 that there is no disagreement about the probabilities of victory or about
the countries’ expected utilities, as represented by the point á on the war line. That may not be so.
Focal points are discussed in Schelling (1956).
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52Instead, as in the choice between settlement and trial as described below, each nation may be
E relatively confident of  its prospect of victory. Country E may see its probability of winning as ð ,
O E O and country O may see its probability of winning as ð  where, ð  > ð  . Different expectations of
E victory imply different expected utilities of war represented by distinct no-agreement points á  ard
O E O á , where excess confidence in victory implies that á  is to the left of  á  along the war line. 
Figure B4: Some Causes of War
E O E E Corresponding to the no-agreement points, á  and á , are a distinct ranges,{â  , ä } and
O O E E {â  , ä }, on the bargaining line. Country E’s bargaining range {â  , ä } must begin and end to the
O O left of the beginning and the end country O’s bargaining range {â  , ä }, but the ranges may or
may not overlap. If the ranges overlap, there is still room for a bargain to avert war, somewhere
O E between â  and ä . Otherwise, as illustrated in figure B4, there is none. As figure B4 is
E E O O constructed, the countries’ predicted utilities in the event of war - U (W, ð ) and U (W, ð ) as
indicated by the point á* above the bargaining line - are high enough that war really would be
preferable to negotiation if both countries’ predictions of their utilities were correct. One or both
predictions must be mistaken, but that mistake leads to war.
53E Another cause of war can be illustrated by a reinterpretation of Figure B4. Think of á  and
O á  not as perceived no-agreement points, but as actual no-agreement points depending on which
E O country strikes first. Once again, there would be a mutually-advantageous bargain if á  and á
O E were close enough that â  is to the left of  ä  , leaving a range within which both countries are
better off than they would expect to be in the event of war, regardless of who strikes first. Such a
bargain is possible but very fragile. Fearing that the other country might strike first regardless,
each country acquires a strong incentive to do so itself.
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A third interpretation of the no-agreement points in figure B4 is that countries’ prospects at
E O  war may change over time. Think of ð  and ð as pertaining to different times rather than different
 
E expectations or different actions. Let  ð   be country E’s probability of winning a war today, while
O  E O  ð  is country E’s probability of winning a war tomorrow. If  ð   is significantly larger than  ð ,
then country E has an incentive to declare war today,  when its probability of winning is high,
rather than to wait until tomorrow when its probability of winning is low and when the terms of a
bargain to avert war will have be become unfavourable.  Bargains at different times may be
interdependent, as when a country’s ability to wage war tomorrow depends on how much territory
it will have acquired in bargaining today. A reasonable and accommodating country might be
nickle-and-dimed into defeat. 
Behind these causes of war lies a problem of commitment. Almost regardless of the
technologies of bargaining and of war, some bargain preferable to war can almost always be
devised as long as both sides can be confident that promises will be kept. It is precisely that
confidence which may be lacking in relations between nations. Promises not to strike first or not
to reopen negotiation tomorrow when relative strengths have changed are not credible unless
resort to war is disadvantageous to both countries. 
In explaining the descent from negotiation to war, Fearon starts with the premise that one
way or another, some bargain from the set of all mutually-advantageous bargains would be struck
if circumstances conformed to the paradigmatic bargain in figure 1. Somehow, countries would
settle upon one point on the continuum from â, which the is best for country O, to ä, which is the
Both countries’ first strike advantage may be reduced when both countries are armed. 
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By arming itself, country E increases its chances of winning a war, pushing á  and á  to the left
E O
along the war line. Correspondingly, country O would push á  and á  to the right. When both
E O
countries arm themselves, it is at least possible that á  ard á  are pushed together, opening an
E O
opportunity for bargaining that might not otherwise exist. On arming see, Garfinkel (1990) and
Intrilligator and Brito (1984). 
54best for country E. Fearon’s argument is that even if some bargain would be struck in these
conditions, the circumstances of nations are different enough from the paradigmatic bargain that
no alternative to war can be agreed upon. This not to deny that the premise may turn out to be
false. Countries may resort to war because they cannot agree on which bargain to adopt. Countries
may be just plain stubborn, each demanding a better deal than the other is prepared to allow.
A common thread runs through all of the examples in this appendix: the sharing of profit,
the choice between settlement and trial, the balance of influence between legislature and
executive, the determination of public policy by voters, legislators and the executive, and the
descent into war. All identify special circumstances of the parties in conflict, on the working
assumption that some accommodation will be found when disputes conform to the paradigmatic
bargain. Either a specific bargain (such as a fifty-fifty split) is postulated or it is explained how
actual disputes differ enough from the paradigmatic bargain that no common ground remains. It is
not my purpose to fault this procedure. Bargainers do often split the difference. Special
circumstances can be interesting and important. My purpose is to suggest that confidence in the
determinacy of bargaining can be unwarranted and to call attention to the distance between the
common premise that mutually-advantageous will, one way or another, be struck, and a full-
fledged bargaining equilibrium where people act in their own interest exclusively, maximizing
utility in the light of what others are expected to do.
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